

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE 4535

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

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AMEMBASSY WARSAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 7 USNATO 6143

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, CSCE

SUBJECT: CANADIAN, FRG, TURKISH AND UK CONTRIBUTIONS

TO NATO REPORT ON CSCE IMPLEMENTATION

REF: (A) STATE 265526

(B) STATE 265527

(C) STATE 265528

1. AS REPORTED SEPTTEL, WE HAVE PASSED TO INTERNATIONAL STAFF
US CONTRIBUTIONS (TRANSMITTED REFTELS) TO NATO REPORT ON
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CSCE IMPLEMENTATION.

2. AT NOVEMBER 11 POLADS, CANADIAN, GERMAN, TURKISH AND UK
DELS ALSO CONTRIBUTED REPORTS (TEXTS BELOW).

3. ITALIAN DEL ALSO MADE AVAILABLE COPY IN FRENCH OF EC REPORT ON CSCE FOLLOW-UP APPROVED BY EC FOREIGN MINISTERS IN ROME ON OCTOBER 30. TEXT WILL BE FORWARDED AS SOON AS TRANSLATION COMPLETED.

4. BEGIN CANADIAN TEXT:

CSCE IMPLEMENTATION:

A SNAPSHOT OF POST-HELSINKI EASTERN EUROPE

GENERAL

THE GENERAL THEME OF REPORTS FROM OUR EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS ON CSCE IMPLEMENTATION IS THAT NOT MUCH HAS HAPPENED TO DATE, ESPECIALLY IN BILATERAL RELATIONS. IN OFFERING THE COMMENTS THAT FOLLOW ON CONDITIONS IN VARIOUS OF THESE COUNTRIES, WE WOULD LIKE TO RECALL A VARIETY OF CONSIDERATIONS THAT WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND AT THIS POINT IN TIME:

(1) WE THINK IT IS TOO EARLY FOR A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW EXERCISE ON WP IMPLEMENTATION OF CSCE, ALTHOUGH IT IS USEFUL TO TAKE A "SNAPSHOT" OF WHERE WE STAND AT THIS MOMENT;

(2) WE SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED NOR OVERLY CRITICAL AT THE LACK OF PROGRESS TO DATE; AFTERALL EVEN CANADA, A COUNTRY COMMITTED TO THE ACTIVE PURSUIT OF FOLLOW-UP, IS STILL IN THE PRELIMINARY STAGES OF DELINEATING ITS PRIORITIES; AND

(3) IT MAY ALSO BE USEFUL TO KEEP IN MIND THAT WE MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO MISINTERPRET THE MEANINGS OF CERTAIN SMALL BUT POSITIVE STEPS BY THE WP. MUCH OF THE "PROGRESS" NOTED BELOW WAS NOT NECESSARILY PROMPTED BY THE RESULTS OF THE CSCE BUT RATHER BY UNRELATED EXTANT OBJECTIVE FACTORS, E.G., GIEREK'S WESTERN-ORIENTED TRADE POLICY AND ITS POSITIVE EFFECTS ON QUESTIONS OF ACCESS, OR FORTUITOUS TIMING, E.G., THE CZECH'S LONG OVERDUE RESPONSE TO CANADIAN TRADE INITIATIVES.

IN CONCLUSION, WE BELIEVE THAT DISJOINTED OR SEEMINGLY CONFIDENTIAL

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INCREMENTAL SIGNS OF MOVEMENT SHOULD BE VIEWED WITH HELTHY SKEPTICISM UNTIL, OVER TIME, DEFINITE PATTERNS EMERGE AND DEVELOP.

USSR

VIRTUALLY NO NOTICEABLE CHANGES APART FROM CERTAIN "RHETORICAL FLIGHTS". ALTHOUGH NO MOVEMENT ON A BILATERAL BASIS, THERE HAS BEEN SOME PROGRESS VIS-A-VIS SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES REGARDING VISAS FOR JOURNALISTS. THE CITY OF VYBORG (ON THE BALTIC NEAR THE FINNISH BORDER) HAS REPORTEDLY BEEN OPENED TO FOREIGNERS. THE NOTIFICATION OF NATO MANOEUVRES UNDER CBMS WAS MET WITH AN ANTI-NATO MEDIA CAMPAIGN.

THE ENTIRE FINAL ACT WAS PUBLISHED IN THE PRESS.

POLAND

TO DATE LITTLE PROGRESS TO REPORT. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE THERE WAS A COMPLETE LACK OF RESPONSE TO OUR NOTIFICATION OF MANOEUVRES UNDER CBMS; INDEED THE POLES HAVE NO MECHANISM FOR RECEIVING NOTIFICATIONS. THEY HAVE NOT ACCEPTED INVITATIONS FOR OBSERVERS. ON THE OSTENSIBLY POSITIVE SIDE, THEY DID NOT FOLLOW THE SOVIET LEAD IN LAUNCHING MEDIA ATTACKS ON THE WEST ON MANOEUVRES.

APPARENTLY THE POLES HAVE ARGUED THAT CHANGES IN RULES, REGULATIONS, ETC., AS A RESULT OF CSCE ARE NOT NECESSARY BECAUSE OF THE ADVANCED NATURE OF SOCIALIST LAW. THERE IS SOME TRUTH TO THIS SINCE THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF LAW TENDS TO BE EITHER IDIOSYNCRATIC OR RESPONSIVE TO THE CURRENT PARTY LINE (OR A COMBINATION OF BOTH) AND CAN THEREFORE BE INTERPRETED TO SUIT THE PARTICULAR OCCASION OR NEED. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT FOREIGN MINISTER OLSZOWSKI TOLD SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AMCEACHEN DURING HIS VISIT THAT SENIOR POLISH OFFICIALS WOULD MEET LATER IN THE AUTUMN TO DISCUSS THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINAL ACT, PRESUMABLY ON INTERNAL POLICIES, AND BEFORE THE NEW YEAR WOULD CONSULT WITH THE REST OF THE WPO ON HOW TO BRING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ACT TO LIFE. IN LIGHT OF THIS COMMENT THE REPORTED FORTHCOMING MAJOR SPEECH BY PRIME MINISTER JAROSZEWICZ ON CSCE IMPLEMENTATION MAY BE WORTH WATCHING FOR AND ANALYZING CAREFULLY.

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THE FAMILY REUNIFICATION PROBLEM IS A RELATIVELY SMALL ONE WHICH CSCE PROBABLY WILL AFFECT MINIMALLY. A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE THE DEBUREAUCRATIZATION OF PROCEDURES FOR STUDENTS, JOURNALISTS, ETC., PROBLEMS OF COMMERCIALY RELATED ACCESS ARE FEW BECAUSE IT IS GIEREK'S POLICY TO DO BUSINESS WITH THE WEST. INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, COPIES OF THE FINAL ACT HAVE NOT BEEN READILY AVAILABLE DESPITE POLISH

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ANNOUNCEMENTS TO THE CONTRARY. IT IS WORTH RECALLING IN THIS REGARD THAT THE FINAL ACT WAS PUBLISHED IN THE PRESS ONLY WITH APPROPRIATE DELETIONS. SHOULD THE POLISH YOUTH LEAGUE OR SOME OTHER AGENCY UNDERTAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF CONDUCTING A CSCE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN IT WILL BE MOST INTERESTING TO SEE HOW THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CSCE RESULTS IS EXPLAINED.

PERHAPS THE FIRST REAL INDICATION WE GET OF WHAT CSCE REALLY MEANS TO THE POLISH AUTHORITIES AND ITS POTENTIAL EFFECT ON CANAD-POLISH RELATIONS WILL BE WHEN WE RECEIVE THEIR DRAFT PROPOSED CONSULAR CONVENTION. THIS WILL BE THE CONFIDENTIAL

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FIRST SUCH DOCUMENT IN THE POST-HELSINKI ERA.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

THE GOVERNMENTAL POSITION SHOWS SOME SIGNS OF SOFTENING BUT THIS BARELY PERCEPTIBLE CHANGE MAY BE DUE MORE TO RECENT INTERNAL CHANGES (ESPECIALLY HUSAK'S ASSUMPTION OF THE PRESIDENCY) RATHER THAN A REACTION TO A CSCE STIMULUS. THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE ALLOWED TO VISIT THE WEST AND GENUINE EFFORTS NOW APPEAR TO BE UNDER WAY TO CLEAR UP A BACKLOG OF FAMILY REUNIFICATION CASES. IN THE COMMERCIAL SPHERE THERE HAVE BEEN POSITIVE REACTIONS TO CANADIAN APPROACHES OVER PAST SEVERAL WEEKS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED HOWEVER THAT THESE WERE LONG OVERDUE AND THEIR TIMING WITH CSCE WAS LIKELY MERELY A COINCIDENCE. CZECH RESPONSES ON MATTERS RELATED TO CBMS FOLLOWED THE MOSCOW LINE, BUT UPON BEING INFORMED OF THE GROSSE ROCHADE EXERCISE THE FOREIGN MINISTRY RESPONSE WAS "HELSINKI WORKS". IN THIS INSTANCE WE

MIGHTHAVE REPLIED "TRUE, BUT FOR WHOM?"

THE CZECH POSITION ON IMPLEMENTATION CAN BE SUMMARIZED AS LEANING TOWARD A POSITIVE APPROACH BUT BEING AWARE CONSTANTLY OF MOSCOW'S RESTRICTIONS.

HUNGARY

IT APPEARS THAT THE SENIOR LEVELS OF THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT ARE POSITIVELY DISPOSED TOWARDS FOLLOW-UP. THE HUNGARIANS BELIEVE THEY ARE STARTING OUT FROM A RELATIVELY ADVANCED BASE. ONE INTERESTING CHANGE WHICH HAS OCCURRED AND WHICH MAY WELL BE RELATED TO THE RESULTS OF THE CSCE EXERCISE IS THAT OFFICIALS NOW POINT TO THE FACT, PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED HERETICAL, THAT HUNGARY ONCE BELONGED TO A CENTRAL EUROPEAN EMPIRE RATHER THAN TO MERELY THE EASTERN EUROPEAN GROUPING. THIS EVIDENTLY IS INTENDED TO EMPHASIZE CONNECTIONS WITH BOTH EAST AND WEST BUT WE WILL HAVE TO WAIT FOR TANGIBLE RESULTS, IF ANY, TO EMERGE.

THE HUNGARIANS STATE THEY WILL SOON PRESENT PROPOSALS BASED ON THE CSCE TEXT FOR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. WE ARE WILLING TO RECEIVE THESE AND WILL ENCOURAGE THIS ACTIVITY DURING THE VISIT TO OTTAWA DECEMBER 2 AND 3 OF VICE-FOREIGN MINISTER NAGY. APPARENTLY THE FINAL ACT HAS BEEN TRANSLATED CONFIDENTIAL

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AND PUBLISHED IN THREE RELATIVELY LOW COST EDITIONS (100,000 COPIES ALLEGEDLY PUBLISHED IN THE MEDIUM PRICED EDITION) AND IN THE "INTERNATIONAL REVIEW". HOWEVER IT MUST BE AN ALL-TIME BEST SELLER BECAUSE NONE IS TO BE FOUND IN BUDAPEST BOOKSTORES.

ROMANIA

GOOD MOVEMENT ON FAMILY REUNIFICATION OCCURRED DURING THE SUMMER MONTHS, ALTHOUGH NO FURTHER MOVEMENT SINCE THEN. NO VISIBLE IMPLEMENTATION OF MOST BASKET III ITEMS: THERE IS STILL NO SIGN OF WESTERN PAPERS, PERIODICALS ETC., ON PUBLIC SALE AND NO SIGN OF AN INCREASE IN WESTERN FILMS IN THEATRES OR ON T.V. ON THE OTHER HAND, CANADIAN BUSINESSMEN HAVE LITTLE TROUBLE OBTAINING ROMANIAN VISAS. OUR NOTIFICATIONS OF MANOEUVRES WERE NOT ACKNOWLEDGED AND WE HAVE NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF THEIR ACTIVITIES UNDER CBMS.

BULGARIA

IT WOULD SEEM TO BE BULGARIA NOT CZECHOSLOVAKIA THAT IS TAKING THE HARDEST AND MOST UNCO-OPERATIVE LINE ON CSCE FOLLOW-UP. APPARENTLY THE BULGARIANS ARE ACTIVELY TRYING TO FRUSTRATE FAMILY REUNIFICATION EFFORTS THROUGH THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW REGULATIONS PROHIBITING BULGARIAN NATIONALS FROM DIRECT CONTACT WITH FOREIGN MISSIONS. THIS IS DEFINITELY CONTRARY TO BOTH THE WORD AND SPIRIT OF HELSINKI.

IT IS WORTHWHILE TO NOTE THAT HIGH BULGARIAN AUTHORI-

TIES INFORMED SECRETARY OF STATE FAULKNER (RESPONSIBLE FOR CULTURE IN THE FEDERAL CABINET) DURING HIS VISIT THERE THAT THEY HAD THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE ALL INFORMATION THAT WAS:

- (1) PORNOGRAPHIC;
- (2) PORTRAYED VIOLENCE; OR
- (3) LIKELY TO UNDERMINE THE PHILOSOPHY AND VALUES OF A SOCIALIST STATE.

NEEDLESS TO SAY DURING THE FAULKNER VISIT THE CANADIAN DELEGATION SAW NO WESTERN NEWSPAPER OR OTHER PUBLICATION FOR PUBLIC SALE.

FINALLY, OUR MANOEUVRES NOTIFICATIONS WERE NOT ACKNOWLEDGED.

END CANADIAN TEXT.
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5. BEGIN FRG TEXT:

SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CSCE FINAL ACT

1. IN IMPLEMENTING THE CSCE DECISIONS, PRIMARY ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE RESOLUTION ON THE FOLLOW-UP TO THE CONFERENCE, IN ADDITION TO THE OPERATIVE ELEMENTS OF THE CSCE FINAL ACT. THIS RESOLUTION CONSISTS OF TWO PARTS:

- THE PARTICIPATING STATES REPEAT THEIR DETERMINATION TO IMPLEMENT THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE IN ORDER TO GIVE FULL EFFECT TO ITS RESULTS;

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- A CERTAIN MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK IS SET IN WHICH THE PARTICIPATING STATES STATE THEIR INTENTION TO PROCEED TO A THOROUGH EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND TO HOLD A MEETING AT BELGRADE IN 1977 FOR THIS PURPOSE. A PREPARATORY MEETING TO ORGANIZE THIS MEETING WILL BE HELD AT BELGRADE ON 15 JUNE 1977 AND WILL BE ATTENDED BY THE 35 STATES WHICH PARTICIPATED IN CSCE. SINCE THE PREPARATORY WORK COMPRISES THE AGENDA AND THE MODALITIES OF THE MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES APPOINTED BY THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, IMPORTANT PRELIMINARY DECISIONS FOR THE MAIN MEETING WILL ALREADY BE TAKEN AT THAT LEVEL.
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2. IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT THE CSCE DECISIONS, TO EVALUATE THEM CONTINUOUSLY AND TO FEED THIS EVALUATION BACK INTO THE 1977 STOCK-TAKING EXERCISE, AN OVERALL CONCEPT FOR ALL ASPECTS OF CSCE IS REQUIRED. IF THE VARIOUS SUBJECT MATTERS OF THE CONFERENCE FOLLOW-UP WERE REGARDED IN ISOLATION, THIS WOULD HAVE THE RESULT THAT WE WOULD LOSE CONTROL OVER THE IMPLEMENTATION AND WOULD EASE THE EFFORTS OF THE EASTERN SIDE TO EXCLUDE FROM THE OVERALL EVALUATION THOSE DECISIONS TO WHICH WE ATTACH PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE.

3. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CSCE DECISIONS SHOULD DISTINGUISH BETWEEN UNILATERAL, BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL EFFORTS. TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, THE FINAL ACT ITSELF LAYS DOWN TO WHICH OF THESE THREE TYPES THE EFFORTS MUST BE ASSIGNED, WHILE THIS QUESTION HAS BEEN LEFT OPEN IN OTHER RESPECTS. THE TEXTS ARE THEREFORE BEING ANALYSED BY US TO SEE WHETHER THEY REQUIRE AUTONOMOUS MEASURES OR WHETHER THEY FORM PART OF THE BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL MEASURES AND THUS REQUIRE A SPECIAL INITIATIVE. WE SHOULD TRY TO ARRIVE AT AN AGREED VIEW WITHIN THE ALLIANCE CONCERNING THE CLASSIFICATION OF THESE MEASURES INTO UNILATERAL, BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL ONES. FOR DIVERGENT VIEWS IN THE WEST WOULD ONCE AGAIN FAVOUR THE EASTERN TREND TO NIP IN THE BUD ANY EXPECTATIONS AND DEMANDS FOR AUTONOMOUS ACTS BY REFERENCE TO THE NEED FOR BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION.

UNILATERAL MEASURES

4. THESE MEASURES ARE OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE FOR US AND ARE, AT THE SAME TIME, MOST SENSITIVE IN NATURE FOR THE EAST; THEY CONCERN QUESTIONS OF THE PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MANOEUVRES AND THE INVITATION TO SEND OBSERVERS, QUESTIONS OF AN ECONOMIC NATURE (CONTACTS, EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION, INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION), AND ESPECIALLY COOPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS. PROBLEMS WILL ARISE ESPECIALLY FROM THE FACT, THAT, IN THE VARIOUS EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES, THE WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE VARIES WITH THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN EACH COUNTRY. IF WE WERE TO INSIST TOO AGGRESSIVELY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATIONS OF INTENT, THIS MIGHT HAVE THE EFFECT THAT THE EASTERN EUROPEAN

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COUNTRIES DRAW MORE CLOSELY TOGETHER, WHICH WOULD DESTROY THE WILLINGNESS - EXISTING IN SOME OF THE COUNTRIES - TO BRING ABOUT INCONSPICUOUS IMPROVEMENTS OF A PRACTICAL NATURE. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE CANNOT BUT CALL ATTENTION TO THE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE CSCE TEXTS AND EXISTING PRACTICE.

5. THE DIFFERENCES IN THE SITUATION BETWEEN THE VARIOUS EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES THEREFORE REQUIRE A DETAILED ANALYSIS IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO DETERMINE OUR ATTITUDE ACCORDINGLY. OUR REMINDERS WILL BE TAKEN THE MORE SERIOUSLY BY THE OTHER SIDE THE GREATER HAS BEEN THE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE WESTERN PARTNERS IN THE ALLIANCE. IN THIS CONTEXT, IT MIGHT BE CONCEIVABLE THAT WE AGREE ON A KIND OF DIVISION OF LABOUR IN THE FORM THAT EACH MEMBER COUNTRY OF THE ALLIANCE CONCENTRATES ON THE AREAS WHICH ARE MOST IN LINE WITH ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THE RESULTS WILL BENEFIT ALL OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES SINCE THEY MAY INVOKE THESE RESULTS IN THEIR OWN NATIONAL POLICIES. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THAT THE INITIATIVES OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE COORDINATED BY MEANS OF A PERMANENT EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION.

6. OUR INSISTANCE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNILATERAL MEASURES PROVIDED FOR IN THE CSCE FINAL ACT WILL BE GREATLY STRENGTHENED IF WE MANIFEST OUR OWN WILLINGNESS TO IMPLEMENT THE CSCE DECISIONS. THE POLEMIC REACTION OF THE EAST TO THE FIRST PRIOR NOTIFICATIONS OF MILITARY MANOEUVRES ILLUMINATES THE EMBARRASSMENT WHICH HAS BEEN CAUSED FOR THE EAST.

BILATERAL MEASURES

7. IN CONTRAST TO THE UNILATERAL MEASURES, THE BILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT WILL REQUIRE AN INITIATIVE FROM OUR SIDE. IT IS BECOMING VISIBLE ALREADY NOW THAT ESPECIALLY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GDR WILL WITHDRAW TO THE POSITION THAT, AS FAR AS HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION IS CONCERNED, THE FINAL ACT DID NOT CONSTITUTE A BASIS FOR

DEMANDS FOR INTERNAL CHANGES. THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO BASKET
III IS EXPLAINED IN GREAT DETAIL IN AN ARTICLE IN "IZVESTIYA"
OF 4 SEPTEMBER 1975 BY ARBATOV WHICH CAN BE REGARDED AS THE
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OFFICIAL SOVIET INTERPRETATION. IT SAYS THAT THE SOVIET
UNION WOULD, OF COURSE, RESPECT THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL
ACT BUT WOULD DO SO ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY AND IN
STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT OF THE
DOCUMENT. RECIPROCITY WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE WESTERN PRACTICES
STILL REPRESENTED OBSTACLES IN THE HUMANITARIAN FIELD. THIS
IS FOLLOWED BY A REFERENCE TO THE MORAL DECAY IN THE WEST.

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8. THE SAME LANGUAGE IS USED BY MR. HONECKER IN HIS SPEECH OF
11 SEPTEMBER 1975 TO UNITS OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S ARMY IN
WHICH HE SUBORDINATES THE EXTENSION OF HUMAN CONTACTS AND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION,

SOCIALIST LEGALITY AND THE DEFENSE AGAINST ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE AND IDEOLOGICAL SUBVERSION. EVEN IF IT IS ADMITTED THAT THESE REMARKS HAVE BEEN MADE PRINCIPALLY FOR INTERNAL CONSUMPTION AND TO PREVENT EXCESSIVE EXPECTATIONS, THEY NEVERTHELESS POINT TO THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH MUST BE EXPECTED.

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9. IN DECIDING WHETHER WE WISH TO WORK TOWARDS BILATERAL AGREEMENTS IN A CONCRETE AREA, WE SHOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT THIS WOULD AGAIN GIVE US POSSIBILITIES TO TAKE MORE INITIATIVES. WE WOULD GAIN THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPELLING THE OTHER SIDE TO SHOW A REACTION WHEREVER THIS IS POSSIBLE. WE WOULD THUS EITHER ACHIEVE A FACTUAL IMPROVEMENT OR COULD, DURING THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE, PRODUCE CONCRETE EXAMPLES SHOWING A LACK OF WILLINGNESS TO IMPLEMENT THE FINAL ACT.

MULTILATERAL MEASURES

10. AS FAR AS MULTILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION IS CONCERNED, THE RESOLUTION ON THE FOLLOW-UP TO THE CONFERENCE PROVIDES FOR TWO POSSIBILITIES:

- MEETINGS OF EXPERTS OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES;
- WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF EXISTING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS THE UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE (ECE) AND UNESCO WITH REGARD TO EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL COOPERATION.

11. WITH RESPECT TO A NUMBER OF CSCE RESULTS, THE TEXTS IN SUBSTANCE SPECIFICALLY PROVIDE FOR MULTILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION, WHILE OTHERS AT LEAST LEAVE THIS POSSIBILITY OPEN. PRACTICALLY NONE OF THE CSCE DECISIONS ARE EXCLUDED FROM MULTILATERAL DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF ECE AND UNESCO.

12. IN THIS RESPECT, WE MUST RECKON WITH THE NATURAL INTEREST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED AND THE AMBITION OF THEIR EXECUTIVE COUNCILS TO ENLARGE THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES BY CSCE MATTERS AND TO INCORPORATE THEM INTO THEIR NORMAL WORK. FOR, IF MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE FOR WHICH THEY REGARD THEMSELVES AS COMPETENT AND RESPONSIBLE WERE DISCUSSED OUTSIDE ECE AND UNESCO, THIS IS BOUND TO BE UNPOPULAR WITH THEM. MOREOVER, WE MUST BE PREPARED THAT THE EASTERN SIDE MIGHT TRY TO TRANSFER THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION OF CSCE DECISIONS IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD AND THAT OF COOPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER AREAS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WHERE THEY CAN - IN VIEW OF THEIR METHOD OF WORK AND/OR COMPOSITION - EXPECT THAT THE DEMANDS ADDRESSED TO THE EAST WILL BE SUCCESSFULLY NEUTRALIZED.

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13. WE SHOULD THEREFORE EXAMINE THE PROS AND CONS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CSCE DECISIONS BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. IT COULD BE ARGUED IN FAVOUR OF AN EXTENSIVE TRANSFER OF THESE FUNCTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS THAT BY THEIR VERY EXISTENCE THEY WOULD BE THE LOGICAL INSTITUTION TO TAKE OVER FOLLOW-UP MEASURES OF A MULTILATERAL CONFERENCE LIKE CSCE, ESPECIALLY SINCE THERE WILL IN THIS RESPECT BE A VACUUM BETWEEN HELSINKI AND BELGRADE. IN ALL THOSE CASES WHERE THE CSCE DECISIONS DO NOT DESIGNATE A BODY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MULTILATERAL MEASURES, THERE IS A DANGER THAT EACH PARTICIPATING STATE ORGANIZES ANY DESIRED NUMBER OF MEETINGS OF EXPERTS - PROVIDED FOR IN THE RESOLUTION ON THE FOLLOW-UP TO THE CONFERENCE -, MEETINGS, SEMINARS OR OTHER FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES. ECE AND UNESCO COULD BE UTILIZED TO CHANNEL SUCH PROJECTS IN ORDER TO PREVENT THEIR PROLIFERATION. THIS WOULD ALSO OBTAIN A POSSIBLE TREND TO CREATE NEW MULTILATERAL ORGANS.

14. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST THE EXTENSIVE TRANSFER OF THESE FUNCTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IS THAT THIS MULTILATERALIZATION WOULD DEPRIVE US OF THE INSTRUMENT FOR THE EFFECTIVE UNILATERAL OR BILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE DECISIONS. ECE AND UNESCO MIGHT BECOME A MULTILATERAL RATIFICATION MACHINE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CSCE DECISIONS. THIS WOULD HAVE THE RESULT THAT THE MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS WOULD, AT THE SAME TIME, ALSO TAKE OVER THE EVALUATION OF IMPLEMENTATION OR WOULD, AT LEAST, PREJUDICE THEIR EVALUATION BY THE GOVERNMENTAL REPRESENTATIVES IN 1977 TO WHOM THIS EVALUATION IS RESERVED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT. IN THIS WAY, LARGE PARTS OF THE CONTENTS OF BASKETS II AND III WOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE STOCK-TAKING EXERCISE OF 1977, AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD GET CLOSER TO ITS AIM TO CONFINE THE DISCUSSION TO QUESTIONS OF SECURITY, MORE PARTICULARLY TO THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. SUCH A RESULT WOULD ENDANGER THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT OF THE WEST ON CSCE AND THE UNIFORM IMPLEMENTATION AND ASSESSMENT OF CSCE DECISIONS.

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15. IN ADDITION, CERTAIN OBJECTIONS MUST BE RAISED WHICH ARE DUE TO THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF ECE AND UNESCO. THE METHOD OF WORK OF ECE IS CUMBERSOME, AND THIS BODY DOES NOT SEEM TO BE PARTICULARLY SUITABLE. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT ECE HAS NOT RECEIVED ANY MANDATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS, IT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO COMPEL THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES TO REVEAL THEIR POSITIONS IN CONCRETE CASES, LET ALONE TO ABANDON THEM. IN PRACTICE, THE ECE WILL PROBABLY DRAFT FINAL REPORTS IN WHICH THE OPPOSING VIEWS WILL BE REFLECTED WITHOUT CLARIFYING WHERE THE VARIOUS INTERESTS LIE. UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS ARE LIKELY TO BE GLOSSED OVER.
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16. IN THE CASE OF UNESCO, IT MUST BE FEARED THAT THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES - POSSIBLY WITH THE HELP OF THIRD COUNTRIES - WILL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE ORGANIZATION IN ORDER TO INFLUENCE DECISIONS IN A SENSE DESIRED BY THEM. THEY COULD, FURTHERMORE, INVOLVE UNESCO DOCUMENTS WHICH, AS A RULE, TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE WESTERN CONCEPTS CONCERNING THE ARRANGEMENT OF CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC RELATIONS WITH THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES TO A MUCH MORE LIMITED EXTENT THAN THE CSCE DECISIONS. THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES MIGHT TRY TO GIVE A NEW INTERPRETATION TO CSCE DECISIONS IN THE EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC FIELDS BY REFERRING TO UNESCO DOCUMENTS.

17. IF THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MULTILATERALIZATION ARE THUS COMPARED, THE ARGUMENT IS, ON BALANCE, IN FAVOUR OF A RESTRICTED APPROACH. THIS ATTITUDE SHOULD BE COORDINATED AMONG THE WESTERN PARTICIPATING STATES. IF USE IS TO BE MADE OF ECE AND UNESCO FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CSCE DECISIONS,

THE FOLLOWING ASPECTS MIGHT BE BORNE IN MIND:

18. IN THOSE CASES IN WHICH WE INTED TO USE THE CSCE TEXTS IN ORDER TO URGE THEIR UNILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION OR IN ORDER TO INTRODUCE OR IMPROVE BILATERAL CONTACTS OR PROJECTS AND WHERE THIS WOULD BE FRUSTRATED BY MULTILATERALIZATION, NO USE SHOULD BE MADE OF ECE AND UNESCO. TO THE EXTENT THAT IMPLEMENTATION IS ENTRUSTED TO THEM, THIS SHOULD BE CONFINED TO CONCRETE TECHNICAL WORK. THE ACCENT SHOULD BE PLACED ON EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BE CALLED UPON TO EVALUATE CSCE COOPERATION.

RE-INTERPRETATION OF CSCE RESULTS

BILATERAL STATEMENTS

19. A TREND CAN BE IDENTIFIED ON THE PART OF SOME WP COUNTRIES TO INSERT PARTS OF THE FINAL ACT - ESPECIALLY THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES - IN A SELECTED MANNER IN BILATERAL INSTRUMENTS WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY AN ATTEMPT TO SEPARATE THE LIST OF PRINCIPLES FROM THE FINAL ACT -
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IGNORING THE RESULTS ACHIEVED IN BASKETS II AND III - IN ORDER TO OBTAIN SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION OF THE EASTERN VIEW CONCERNING THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT SUCH A SELECTIVE RE-INTERPRETATION OF THE CSCE RESULTS IS NOT IN THE WESTERN INTEREST.

INTERPRETATION AT THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL

20. THE EASTERN SIDE MAY TRY TO PLACE A ONE-SIDED INTERPRETATION ON THE CSCE RESULTS AT MEETINGS OF SO-CALLED "SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS". MEETINGS OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS COULD BE PLACED UNDER A CSCE ASPECT. A CASE IN POINT WAS THE ALL-EUROPEAN SPORTS CONFERENCE IN DRESDEN IN MAY 1975. SINCE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS ARE FREQUENTLY CAUGHT UNAWARES BY SUCH ATTEMPTS AND ARE, IN GENERAL, LESS INDOCTRINATED, IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE WESTERN GOVERNMENTS TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH TAKE PART IN SUCH A MEETING, TO INFORM THEM OF THE WESTERN POSITION AND TO COORDINATE THEIR ACTIONS WITH THEM.

CSCE RESOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

21. THE EASTERN SIDE IS FURTHERMORE TRYING TO INTRODUCE ONE-SIDED CSCE RESOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. AS FAR AS THIS IS CONCERNED, WE SHALL HAVE TO INSIST THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF SUCH A RESOLUTION WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE PRINCIPLE

OF CONSENSUS. THIS MEANS THAT, AS WAS PRACTICED IN GENEVA, THE CSCE PARTICIPANTS HAVE TO FORMULATE AND INTRODUCE THE RESOLUTION JOINTLY. THIS WILL PREVENT THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES FROM OBTAINING CONFIRMATION OF THEIR VERSION OF THE CSCE RESULTS, FREQUENTLY BY EXPLOITING FAVOURABLE MAJORITY SITUATIONS. A CASE IN POINT WAS THE REGIONAL CONFERENCE OF WHO IN ALGIERS IN SEPTEMBER AT WHICH SUCH AN ATTEMPT COULD BE WARDED OFF.

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INTER PARLIAMENTARY UNION

22. AT THE IPU CONFERENCE IN LONDON FROM 2 TO 13 SEPT 1975, THE DELEGATIONS OF THE CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES AGREED TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION OF CSCE QUESTIONS WHICH BEGAN IN HELSINKI IN JANUARY 1973 AND WHICH HAD BEEN CONTINUED IN BELGRADE IN FEBRUARY 1975. THEY WILL INTRODUCE, BY THE IPU SPRING MEETING IN MEXICO IN 1976, SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL PROPOSALS ON CSCE SUBJECTS AND WILL AGREE ON THE FURTHER PROCEDURE AT THE MEETING IN MEXICO. THE GERMAN DELEGATION HAS ANNOUNCED THE SUBJECT OF BASKET III FOR THE

WORK PROGRAMME OF 1976 IN AN INTENTION TO SEIZE IPU AS A
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WHOLE WITH THIS MATTER AND TO COUNTERACT THE AIM OF THE WP
STATES TO TURN SEPARATE CONFERENCES OF THE EUROPEANS,
THE AMERICANS AND THE CANADIANS UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF IPU
INTO A KIND OF PARLIAMENTARY FOLLOW ON ORGAN.

BELGRADE 1977

23. CLOSE COORDINATION WITHIN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE IS THE
CORNER STONE OF AN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CSCE RESULTS WHICH IS
SUCCESSFUL FOR THE WEST. THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WILL HAVE
TO PREPARE THEMSELVES IN TIME FOR THE BELGRADE MEETING.
IT IS TO BE EXPECTED THAT THE WP STATES WILL MAKE NEW
PROPOSALS AND INTRODUCE NEW PROJECTS FOR THE CONTINUATION
OF THE CSCE PROCESS AT THAT MEETING, IF ONLY IN ORDER TO
AVOID A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CSCE DECISIONS. THE WEST, FOR ITS PART, WILL HAVE TO INSIST
ON AN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT
BUT SHOULD ALSO MAKE CONCRETE PROPOSALS AT THIS END IN ORDER
NOT TO LOSE THE INITIATIVE.

END FRG TEXT.

6. BEGIN TURKISH TEXT:

I. GENERAL

THE IDEA THAT THE SPIRIT OF HELSINKI IS AN IMPORTANT
CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROCESS OF DETENTE, AN "IRREVERSIBLE"
PROCESS IS BEING CONTINUOUSLY ADVANCED. IT HAS PARTICULARLY
BEEN STRESSED BY THE SOVIET LEADERS DURING THE RECENT VISITS
OF PRESIDENTS OF PORTUGAL AND FRANCE AS WELL AS THOSE OF
HONECKER AND THE PRIME MINISTRY OF HUNGARY. THE MILITARY
DETENTE SHOULD COMPLEMENT THE POLITICAL DETENTE IS ANOTHER
THEME WHICH HAS BEEN DWELLED ON. GROMYKO'S MOST RECENT
DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS AT THE UNITED NATIONS CAN BE CONSIDERED
WITHIN THE SAME FRAMEWORK OF ACTIVITIES. ANY CRITICISM OF
DETENTE IN THE WEST IS THUS IN TURN VEHEMENTLY CRITICIZED
IN THE SOVIET PRESS. THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON CSCE IS LARGELY
ORCHESTRATED THROUGH THE ACTIVITIES OF WOMAN'S YEAR OF
INTERNATIONAL WORLD CONGRESS, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF
DEMOCRATIC WOMEN, FEDERATION OF WORLD SYNDICATES ETC.

ANOTHER THEME WHICH HAS BEEN STEPPED UP IS THE EXTENSION OF THE
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CSCE EXPERIENCE TO OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD.

II. PRINCIPLES

THE PRINCIPLE OF INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS HAS OCCUPIED A

PROMINENT PLACE IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT BY THE EAST. THE PRINCIPLE IS VIEWED BY THEM AS CONSOLIDATING THE SITUATION RESULTING FROM THE 2ND WORLD WAR. A CONCRETE EXAMPLE OF THIS IS FOUND IN THE TREATY BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND DDR WHICH SINGLES OUT THIS PRINCIPLE AS AN INDISPENSABLE CONDITION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY.

ONLY IN THE CASE OF ROMANIA, CAN ONE PERCEIVE A DIFFERENT ATTITUDE. ALL PRINCIPLES ARE STRESSED AND IN BILATERAL RELATIONS THESE ARE REGISTERED TO THE UTMOST EXTENT POSSIBLE. THE QUESTION WHETHER THE CSCE PRINCIPLES ALSO AIM TO SAFEGUARD THE SOCIO-POLITICAL REGIMES HAS ALSO BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE SOVIET PRESS AS A RESULT OF WESTERN ACCUSATIONS OF THE POSSIBLE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN SOME CASES IN EUROPE. HAVING REJECTED THESE ACCUSATION IN A SUBTLE MANNER, THE SOVIET PRESS HOWEVER HAS OBJECTED TO THE IDEA THAT THE PRINCIPLES AIM TO SAFEGUARD THE STATUS QUO IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES. THEY CONSIDER THAT THE PRINCIPLES WILL ENCOURAGE THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES AND THAT THIS WILL BE AIDED BY IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE.

III. THE THIRD BASKET

THIS QUESTION REMAINS AN ALLERGIC ONE FOR THE EASTERN BLOC. THE SOVIET VIEW IT WITH SUSPICION. ZHADANOV'S ARTICLE IS A CASE IN POINT. THE ONLY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS ARE THE MULTI ENTRY VISAS GRANTED TO AMERICAN AND FRENCH JOURNALISTS. THE SAME CAN BE SAID IN GENERAL FOR THE EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES. A RARE GESTURE ON THE PART OF THE CZECH GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN THE PERMISSION GIVEN TO PAVEL KOHOUT A RENOWNED WRITER TO GO ABROAD FOR THE STAGING OF THIS PLAY.

END TURKISH TEXT.

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AMEMBASSY WARSAW

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7. BEGIN UK TEXT:

CSCE FOLLOW UP

BASKET I

(I) PRINCIPLES. THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE HAS ALREADY HAD AN ACCOUNT OF THE PRIME MINISTERS VISIT TO ROMANIA, WHEN WE HAD TO RESIST ROMANIAN EFFORTS TO GO BACK ON LANGUAGE AGREED AT HELSINKI. WE WERE NEVERTHELESS ABLE TO OBTAIN A WORTHWHILE RESTATEMENT OF A REASONABLE NUMBER OF CSCE MEASURES.

(II) CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES. WE HAVE GIVEN NOTIFICATION TO OTHER CSCE PARTICIPANTS OF THE UK PARTICIPATION
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IN NATO EXERCISE " DEEP EXPRESS".

BASKET II

THERE HAS BEEN LEAST SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS HERE. WE ARE CONSULTING THE ALLIES IN THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE ON THE BEST MEANS OF OBTAINING IN EASTERN EUROPE BETTER FACILITIES FOR BUSINESSMEN AND AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE FLOW OF ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INFORMATION. THERE HAS BEEN REASONABLE PROGRESS IN REACHING COMMON POSITIONS WITH OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES ON THE ROLE OF THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE IN MULTILATERAL FOLLOW UP. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE ECE, STANOVNIK, VISITED BRITAIN ON 7 NOVEMBER TO DISCUSS THIS ASPECT.

BASKET III

(I) JOURNALISTS. ON 6 NOVEMBER THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN MOSCOW HANDED A NOTE TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS PROPOSING THAT THE SOVIET AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS SHOULD ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS PROVIDE EACH OTHERS JOURNALISTS RESIDENT IN MOSCOW AND LONDON WITH MULTIPLE ENTRY AND EXIT VISAS VALID FOR ONE YEAR. WE HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN TO THE RUSSIANS THAT OTHER ASPECTS OF WORKING CONDITIONS FOR JOURNALISTS SHOULD BE IMPROVED.

(II) PERSONAL CASES

A. WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER VISITED ROMANIA IN SEPTEMBER HE LEFT BEHIND A LETTER ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU

CONTAINING A LIST OF OUTSTANDING PERSONAL CASES WITH ROMANIA. THIS HAS PRODUCED NO RESULT SO FAR AND HM AMBASSADOR HAS DISCUSSED THE MATTER VERY RECENTLY WITH THE ROMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WHO SAID HE HAD NOT SEEN THE PRIME MINISTERS LETTER AND THE ACCOMPANYING LIST. HE UNDERTOOK, HOWEVER, TO PASS THE AMBASSADORS REPRESENTATIONS TO THE APPROPRIATE QUARTER.

B. WE HAVE HAD A DOZEN OR SO CASES OUTSTANDING WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA WHICH WE HAD BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKS WELL BEFORE STAGE III. DURING THE RECENT VISIT OF THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, DR SPACIL, WE HANDED HIM A LIST OF THE CASES. ONE HAS SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN RESOLVED, BUT WE CANNOT CONCLUDE THAT THIS WAS A RESULT OF CSCE.

C. IN THE GDR THERE HAVE IN RECENT MONTHS BEEN A NUMBER OF MARRIAGE CASES. A LARGE PROPORTION WERE RESOLVED BEFORE STAGE III BUT WE KNOW OF SOME THAT HAVE BEEN RESOLVED SINCE. CONFIDENTIAL

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WE BELIEVE THAT OUR REPRESENTATIONS TO THE GDR ON THESE CASES HAVE PLAYED A LARGE PART IN THEIR RESOLUTION AND WE HOPE THAT OUR CONTINUED EFFORTS WILL CLEAR UP THE DOZEN OR SO CASES STILL OUTSTANDING. IT IS UNLIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT THE CSCE ITSELF HAS HAD MUCH EFFECT ON THESE CASES.

(III) INFORMATION, CULTURE AND EDUCATION. RECENT CULTURAL AGREEMENTS WITH POLAND AND ROMANIA HAVE DRAWN ATTENTION TO THE SPIRIT OF THE CSCE. AGREEMENTS DUE TO BE SIGNED WITH HUNGARY NEXT MONTH AND YUGOSLAVIA EARLY IN 1976 WILL, WE HOPE, BE THE FIRST TO BE ROOTED FIRMLY IN THE TERMS OF THE FINAL ACT.

PUBLICATION OF THE FINAL ACT
EASTERN COUNTRIES HAVE SOMETIMES SUGGESTED THAT WE HAVE NOT DONE ALL WE SHOULD ON THIS ASPECT. IT IS THEREFORE PERHAPS WORTH POINTING OUT THAT IMMEDIATELY AFTER STAGE III HMSO PUBLISHED THE FINAL ACT AS A WHITE PAPER IN 3,500 COPIES AND GAVE IT THE SAME DISTRIBUTION AS NEW LEGISLATION.

END UK TEXT. STREATOR

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